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CONSTITUTI ONALITY

OF

SUGAR BOUNTIES

Edward R.O'Malley

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

1891.

SCHOOL OF LAW.

I.
The McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 amonu, other things provides:
"That on and after
there

July

first,1891,ana

until

July first

1905,

shall be paidfrom any moneys in the Treasury not other-

Lwise appropriated under the provisions of

section 3689 of th/

Revised Statutesto the producers of sugar testing not less
than ninety degrees by the

polariscope,from beets,sorghum or

sugar cane grown within the United States,or from maple sap
produced within the United Statesa bounty of two cents per
pound;and upon such sugar testil

less than ninety degrees by

the polariscope,and not less than eighty degrees,a Lounty of
one and three fourth cents per pound under such rules and rogulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenuewith the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury,shall prescribe.
And for the payment of these bounties the Secretary of
the Treasury is authorized to draw warrants on the Treasurpr
of the Unitdd States for such sums as shall be necessary,which
sums shall be certified to him by the Commissioner of Internal Revenueby whom the bounties shall be disbursed,and no
bounty shall be allowed or paid to any person licensed asforesaid in any one year upon any quanity of sugar less than five
hundred pounds. "
The subject of this paper will be:

First the authority

under which Congress acted in granting bounties to sugar

pro-

2.
ducers: Second,the extent to which the courts may go behind
the legislature in declaring an act unconstitutional.
Other questions might very appropriately be dealt with
in

this connection if

time would allow.

What constitutes a pub-

lic as distinguished from a private purpose;and whether lending government aid for the purpose of developiing the United
States into a sugar producing country is a public purpose or
not,are questionsthat should receive more attention than will
be possible to give them here. However,they are largely question of policy or expediency;they must be passed upon by the
legislature rather than the judiciary.

Questions of this na-

ture have given rise to much animated controversey in the past.
the
In the discussion of them ablest and purest minds in our history have disagreed; They have been and are prominent in the
strue

s of political pLarties;defeat

on either side does not

seem to silence opposition or to give security to victory.The
'contest

is

often renewed;and the attack and defence maintain-

ed with equal ardor.

In
that the

considering the first
Federal government is

point,it

must be remembered

one of enumerated poersits

jurisdiction being limited to subjects named in

the Constitu-

tion. Herein lies the chief difference between the Federal

3.
Constitution and the

State Constitutions. In the latter the

powers are limited by the subjects enumerated; and in this the
one is no more a limited government than the other. The general government finds its jurisdiction in the subjects enumerated;the state governments find theirs in
umerated.

It

should ever kept

the subjects not en-

in mind,however,that

this dif-

ference extends only to subjects of jurisdiction and not authority and modes of administration.
The powers delegated to the general government are found
in

Article

I section 8 of the Federal Constitution.These

powers are classified uncder eighteen subdivisions. The power
to give encouragement to sugar growing must be gathered from
them or the act is unconstitutional;as Congress has power only'
to legislate upon subjects within the scope of the enumerated
powers.
It requires but litle study of this section to convince
one that this powerif it
ion one.

It

exists at all,is

found in

subdivis-

would be impossible to justify the act under any

of the subsequently enumerated powers.

They specil/f.cally

name the subjects over which Congress shall have authority.
The power to lend government aid to any great interest in which
the people of the United States are engaged,may be said to exist in two instances only: First

is that of

subdivision

4.
three,which is as follows:

"Congress shall have power to regu-

late commerce with foreign nations,and among the several states
and with the Indian Tribes." And the second that of subdivision eight reading as folbows:
promote the progress of

"Congress shall have power to

Science and the Useful Arts,by pro-

curing for limited times,to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."
It could not be seriously contended that the granting of
bounties to sugar producers had to do either with the regulation of commerce or the promotion of science or the useful
art s.
The constitutionality of the sugar bounty clause of this
act then,depends primaril'y upon the powers given to Congress
by subdivision one of section

eight which is as follows:

"Congress shall have power to lay and collect

taxesdutiesim-

posts,and excises to pay the debts and provide for the connon
defence and general

welfare of the United States;but

all du-

tiesimposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States. "
The extent of the power given to congress by the clause
last quoted has been in

the pastis

at presentand probably

will continue to be,a source of much discussion.

The power

granted by the phrase , "to provide for the general

welfare".

has been the chief bone of contention.
statesmen have differed as to

iany of our ablest

the proper construction to beA'

upon this clause. Some contend that the words
lect taxesduties,imposts and excises,"

"to lay and col-

constitute a

substan-

tive grant of power in themselves and are not limited by that
part of the clause which follows. Others argue that the clause
"to pa- the debts and provide for the common defence and general

welfare" qualifies what goes beforeand that taxesim-

posts etc.,could only be levied for the purpose of paying the
debts and providing for the common defence and general welXfare of the nation. The latter construction is the generally
accepted one; it is accordance with the pr-ctice of the nationgovernent,and sanctioned by eminent

al

constitutional

writ-

ers.
I

If the former be the proper interpretation the govern-

ment of the United States it is saidis in reality,one of unlimited powers notwithstanding the subsequent emumeration of
specific powers."It not only renders wholly unimportant and
unnecessary the subsequent enumeration,but plainly extends far
beyond them,and creates a general authority in Congress to
pass all laws which they may deem for the common defence and
general

we].fare."

(Story on Const.§ 909. )

But as to whether there are two distinct grants of power

included in subdivision one,or the clause "to pay the debts
and provide
is

for the common defence and the general

welfare",

made to qualify what goes before,can make but litle

ference for all

practical

purposes.

dif-

The power of the govern-

ment or the security of the people has litle to gain or lose
by the adoption of one or the other
Either one attains

the same end.

If

of these constructions.
the power of taxation con-

tained in the grant is unlimitedit means simply the power of
the people to tax themselves; for it

must not be forgotten

that our government is adninistered by the people

coming from

each state and the districts in the state. When they lay and
collect money for any purpose,they

alone must bear the burden;

and there can be but litle to fear in the power of a government which is ever to be administered by the people. It is
safe to say that the people will not long oppress themselves
beyond their own endurance. "The fears and jealousies expressed of the
supposes

aggressiveness of governments upon the people prethe separation of the government

its independence of the people."
On the other hand if

we limit

from the peopleor

(Tiffany on Const.§ 338).
the powers of the govern-

ment"to lay and collect taxesdutiesinposts and excises" only
for the purposes of "paying the debts and providing for the
common defence

and general

welfare" of the nation; recognizzing

7.
as we do alsothat

the administrators of the government are

the people themselves,who must necessarily be the exclusive
judges of what purposes are fvr the
al

common defence and gener-

welfare;the limitation is a check of but litle value.There

will never arise an occasion to raise a revenue for any other
purpose than those specified in

the limitation.

When the wide

range of subjects which may engage the attention of governments having to do with the common defence and general we]

-

fare of the nation are taken into consideration it will be
found that everything pertaining to the duty of the government is necessarily included. It is the duty of every civil
government to provide for the security and for the general
welfare of the people.

The government founded by our ances-

tors was intended to be entrusted with the authority of
moting the general

pro-

welfare of the people and was clothed with

every power essential to that end. It is not to be presumed
that they had any misgivings as to this power. They were then,
as the people ever after would be,the best judges of what
means were necessary for such purposes.
638:
eral

"If

Judge Story says at p,

the power to provide for the common defence and gen-

welfare is

ernment is

an independent porer,then it

is

said the gov-

unlimited and the subsequent enumeration of powei-s
i

is

unnecessary

and useless.

If

it

is

a mere appendage or quali-

8.
fication of the power to lay taxesstill it involves.of general

appropriations of the money so raised,which indirectly pro-

duces the same result.

"

Another interpretation contended for is that the clause
"to provide for the common defence and promote the general
welfare" of the nation has no

significance per se;but is

merely a prelude to what follows;that

it simply contains gen-

eral terms, explained and limited, by the subjoined specifica-tions,and therefore could never be taken into consideration
in justifying the legislative act. But the great objection to
this construction is that it robs the clause of all meaning.
No one has a right to assume that any part of the constitution is useless or without a meaning; and especially is the
true,when the attempt is to rob it of what is a natural and
appropriate meaning. Such an interpretation of the constitution would not be construing it; it would be reading that instrument to suit ourselves; in shortit would be doing the
very thing so much complained of,to make a constitution,and
not to administer or construe that

hich our

forefathers

gave us. Connenting on this unatural construction Judge Stor-y
says at § 913:

"it is not said

fence and promote the general

to 'provide for the common dewelfare in the followling man-

ner,viz.,' which would be the natural expression to indicate

such an intention. But it
every

subsequent

stands entirely disconnected from

clause,both in

sense and runcuation; and is

no

more a part of them than they are of the power to lay taxes'
The same great author says:at p,642:
rules of interpretation,one

"One of the best

which common sense

and reason fo.'-

when the object of a power is

bid us to overlook,is,that

clear-

ly defined by its terms or avvowed in the context,it ought to
be construed so as to obtain the object,and not to defeat
The
no

construedthe power may be abusedis

circumstance that so

answer. AlJ powers may be abused;but are they then to

abridged by those who
have

it.

be

are to administer them,or denied to

any operation?"
The history of the proceedings in the convention would

seem to showwith regard to this clausethat it had no reference whatever,to

the subsequently enumertaed powers. The first

resolution adopted on the

subject of the powers of the general

government was,"that the national legislature ought to be empowaered to enjoy the legislative

rights

vested in

the Uonfederationand moreover to legislate
which the

separate

states

are incompetent,or

in
in

all

Congress by
cases

to

which the har-

mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise
of independent

legislation."

Later it was amended so

Jour.of Con.pp,68,80,87,135,233.
as to read:

"And,moreover,to legis-

10.
late in all cases for the general interest of the Union,and
also in those,to which the state are separately incompetent,
or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-rupted by the exercise of individual legislation."

Id. ,p,181,182,

208.
The first draft of the Constitution reported by the
"6oflmittee

of Detail" on August 0,1787,read as folows: "The

legislature of the United states shall have the power to lay
and collect taxes,duties,imposts and excises:"

there being no

limitation whatever,on the power to levy taxes. Later steps
were taken with a view to providing for the payment of debts
incurred during the Revolutionary War. A committee of eleven
was appointed to

consid :r the expediency of the general

ernment assuming the debts incurred by the several

gov-

states dur-

ing that struggle. The report of this conmnittee was as follows:

"The legislature of the United States shall have power

to fulfill the engagementswhich have been entered into by
Congress,and to discharge,as well

the debts of the United

States as the debts incurred by the several
late warfor the conrmon defence and general

states during the
welfare."

After-

wards it was moved to amend the report so as to read as follows:

"The legislature

shall fulfill the engagements and dis-

charge the debts of the United States," which passed unamiimous-

11.
ly after

an ineffectual

charge the debts" to

attempt

"liquidate

to change the phrase
the claim."

"dis-

Id.,279,280.

Later the following amendment to the first

section of

the seventh article,(to lay and collect taxes etc.,) was moved and carried:

"7he legislature shall

and discharge the

fulfill the engagements

debts of the United States,and

power to lay and collect taxes, duties,imposts
Id.,284.

On a subsequent

and agreed to:
into

shall have

and excises."

day the following clause was proposed

"All debts contracted,and engagements entered

y or under the authority of Congress,shall be as valid

against the United States under this Constitutionas under the
Confederation."

On the following day the following amendment to

the article,(to lay taxes etc.,) was proposed -nd defeated:
"For the payment
ses,that

of said debtsand for the defraying

the expen-

shall be incurred for the common defence and general

wellfare. "

Id.

,291.

So that as yet the power to lay and collect taxes was unlinited.

Whatever

been in

dissatisfaction

allowing Congress to

somewhere.

have this

On September 4,another

clause respecting
lature

there was seems

taxation

clearly to have

power without a

check

committee reported that

should read as follows:

the

"The legis-

shall have power to lay and collect taxes,duties iM-

posts and excises,to pay the debts and provide for

12.
the common defence and general

weifare of the United States."

This is substantially as it now stands in the Constitution.
From this it

will be seen that it

was never discussec! as an

independent power;nor as a mere prelude to the

subsequent pow-

ers. What discussion there was in regard to this clause was
in connection with the power to lay t xes. Whether or not the
taxing power should be unqualified seems clearly to have been
the only question under discussion.
"This clause has no reference whatsoever to the Articles
of Confederation nor indeedto any other clause of the Constitution.It is

on its

facea

distinct,substantiveand

independ-

ent power. Who then is at liberty to say that it is to be limited by the other clausesrather than they to be enlarged by
it; since there is no avvowed connection or reference from the
one to the other? Interpretation woul.d here desert its proper
office,that which requires that every part of the expression
ought,if possible to be alloweCd some meaning and made to conspire to some common end."

Story on Const.

§ 917.

It has been further urged in favor of the narrowe& construction that it matters litle whether the clause in question
is to be construed to embody every measure that would be conducive to the general

welfare;or every measure only in which

there might be an appcr .Iiation of money,as is contended by
some;the effect would be the same in making useless the subse-

13.
quently enumeration of powers. For it is said that theice is no
power which may not have some refer'ence to the corrnon defence
and general

welfare;nor a power which in its exercise does

not involve an appropriation of money. According to this interpretation it is said we have an unlimited government founded by a particular enumeration of powers.
There is no better refutation than that given by Judge
Story :t § 919, he says:

"Stripped of the ingenious textureby

which this argument is disguised,it is neither more or less,
than an attent to obliberate from the Constitution the whole
clause

'to pa, the debts,and provide for the commion defence

an. general

welfare of the United States',as entirely sens-

lessor ineqp rjssive of any intention whatsoever* Strike them
out,and the Constitution is exactly what the argument contends for.It is,thereforean argument,that the words ought
not to be in the Constitution because if they are,and have
any meaning,they enlarge it beyond the scope of certain enumerated powers and this is both miscievous and dangerous"
To deny effect to any clause in the Constitutibn,if it
is sensible in the language in which it is expressed and in
the place in which it stands would certainly seem to be a most
unjustifiable latitude of imterpretation. If words are inserted we are bound to presume that they have

some definite object

14.
and intent; and to reason them out of the Constitution upon arguments ab inconvenienti

(which to one mind may appear wholly

unfoundedand to another wholly satisfactory) is to make a new
Constitution not to construe

the old one.

Some of our greatest men have advanced the argument which
Judge Story critizes
rules of interpretation.

as unsound and in

violation of recognized

Mr Madisonwho

next to Hamiltonper-

haps possessed the greatest knowledge of every phase of our
national government,held these vievws. Thomas Jefferson was
always a$ strong opponent of the liberal construction;though in
carrying on the government he was obliged to relax in practice
what he so ably contended for in theory. Tiedeman on Const.
Law,p ,133.
Alexander Hamiltom believed in a liberal construction
of all

the powers granted to the Federal

of this theory as applied to the
"The terms

'general

welfare'

government.ln favor

clause in question he said:

we-,e doubtless

intended to sig-

nify more than was ex- Iessed or was imparted in those which
followed;otherwisenumereous exigencies incident to the affairs
of a nation would have been left
phrase
because

is

as

comprehensive

without a provision.

The

as any that could have been used

it was not fit that the Constitutional authority of

the Union to appropriate its revenue should have been restrict-

ed

within narrower limits than the

'general

aelf are, ' and

because this necessarily embraced a vast varietj of particulars,which are susceptible neither of specification nor definition. It is,therefore,of necessity left to the discretion
of the national legislature to pronounce upon the subjects
which concern the general
description,an

welfare

appropriatioi

One Hamilton's Works

and for which under that

uf money is

(1810,p,2

3

Ipequisite and proper'

0).

This is the interpretation given by one ofif not the
greatest,of those great men who founded our goverrnat. Hamilton's Writings seemin the estimation of the greatest writers
in America,Great Britain

and France,to place him in the

first rank of master minds. It has been said that they exhibit
an extent and precision of information,a profundity of research and an accuracy of understanding,which would have done
honor to the most illustrious
times.

From his large

statesmen of ancient

experience

or modern

as one of the framers of the

Constitution;his numereous writings and deep

study of every

phase of our governmient;certainly his vievas on this subject
are entitled to much weight. And whether his vievis are in accord with the true meaning intended to be conveyed or not,
they are in harmony with the practice of the government for
the past one hundred years.

Appropriation have never

been

16.
limited by Congress to
enunerated in

cases fully

within the specific powers

the ConstitutTon,whether looked upon in their

broad or narrow sense. Money has been raised in an especial
manner to aid internal improvements of all kinds,in our roads,
for the purpose of navigation and other objects of national
character and importance. (Pres. Munroe's Message of Tay 4,
1822) In 1794,Congress raised money to aid the St.Domingo refugees.(Act of Feb.12,1794,ch.2.)
ed to aid the
an earth quake.
difficult

Again in 1812,money was rais-

inhabitants of Venezuela who had suffered from
(Act of May 8,1812,ch.79.)

to justify

such legislation

under any of the powers

delegated to the general government.
a domestic naturewhich

is

clause,is the bounty given
of Feb.16,1792,ch.6.)

It would indeed be

Another illustration

of

identical with the sugar bounty
in the cod fisheries in 1702. (Act

The annual

appropriation acts

speak very

strong language on this point. Every president of the United
Stateswith the single exception of Madison,seems to have acted upon this doctrine. Mr Jefferson certainly gave it a partial

sanction in signing the bill for the Cumberland road.

(Act of March 29,1806,ch.19.)
manifest reluctancebut

President jackson followed with

allowed that it

by the practice of the governmEnt.
BillMay 27,

1830.)

was firmly established

(See veto of

Maysville Road

17.
It is safe to say then,that so far as a course of legislative enactments can settle anything,the power of Congress to
provide for the general

,welfare of the nation,by means which

are plainly adapted to that end,and not prohibited,may be considered as well established. In other words though r-uch discussion,has been indulged and no judicial tribunal ha3 ever
been callec! upon to squarely place a construction upon the
"general vwelfare"clause,yet the people of this country have
solved the question in conformity with the broader construct ion.
But even if it were truethat the framers of the Constit-.
tion believed that they had provided for all the exigencies
that would have to do with the general

welfare of the people;

and that the subsequently enumerated powers included all that
the general

welfare clause meant at that stage of the world,

there could be no great objection to giving to that clause the
new shade of meaning which the terms general
have to day.

welfare may

It is generally conceded by all that the people

of the United States have nothing to regret,as yet because of
the concessions of power made by the states from time to time
to the Federal government. The newly added strength has in
each instance worked admirably. More and more as time goes on,
our people regard the close of our late war as marking the
completion of our national government. The fears and jealous-

18.
ies of the tyrnany of governmentsentertained

so largely by

our forefathers,are no longer a part of the anxieties of the
people. These misgivings were honestly entertained, being
born out of their political

experience with Colonial govern-

ors,and the cruel treatment received at the hands of a tyrranical government

three

that they should look

thousand miles away.

It

was natural

upon any form of government as they did.

But time and experience have proven that agovernment wholly
dependent upon the people for their

existence;a government

over which the people have absolute control;in short,a government which,Pn our caseare the people themselveswill never
attempt much tyranny; for to do that,would be to oppress themselveswhich is

unatural

for man to do.

Indeedso well pleased have the people been with the
workings of the national
cry to da

that its

government that there is

jurisdiction

think that every interest

in

going up

should be extended.
which the public

a

Many

can be concern-

ed ought to be managed by the general government. Railroads,
telegraphs,express
it

is

arguedbe

companies and similar corporations

owned and controlled by the general

should,
govern-

ment;by this they would be made to serve the pablic better at
much less expense. Another equally earnest school urges the
nationalization

of land as the panacea of all

human ills;vrhile

19.
While a third thinks that the government should be the common
parent of us all,taking every interest whatever under its control, This is the condition of things that confronts us to
day. Whether we are passing from better to worse or vice versa,
does not enter into the question under consideration. These
facts exist,and show beyond all question that the terms "general

wel.iare of the United States" as accepted to day,haA a

widely different meaning from that of one hundred years ago,
The progress we have made for the past century has not only
added new meanings to old words,but conditions and relations
have arisen in the commercial,and politico- economic world
that could not have been forseen by our ancestors.
Would it be in accordance with recognized rules of interpretation to give these new shades of meaning to the written words in the constitution when it was plain that the framers of that document could never have had them in mind? It
will not be denied that a true interpretation of the 11-w will
disclose the real intention of the law giver;but in countries
in which popular governments are established the real law giver is not the men who years ago made the law;it is the living
power which is the people in possession of political power.
The correct interpreter of the law need not trouble himself
so much with the intention of the framers of the Constitution

20.
as with the modifications of the written word.

This rule is

recognized by eminent authority. Dr Lieber recognizes this
factor when in distinguishing between the interpretation and
the construction of a constitutioal provisionhe says:

"That a

constitutional sentence then, must be interpreted if we are
desirous to ascertain what precise meaning the framers of the
constitution attached to it;and construedif we are desirous
of knowing how they would have understood it,respecting new
relations which they could not have known at the time and
which nevertheless,fall
provision."

decidely within the province

(Hermeneutics p,168.)

Chief Justice Marshall may be
the same rule in
said:

of this

said to have sanctioned

the celebrated Dartmouth College Case.

He

"That a case may come within the operation of a constitu

tional provision,even though the framers of the constitution
did not anticipate it,providing there is nothing in the written word to indicate that they would have excluded it,if it
had been anticipated."

The conclusion is

obivious then,that the

fare" phrase has a meaning per se.
fair

and natural

"general wel

It has it :first,from a

construction as the

clause stands; second, it

has been established by the practice of our government for the
past century,though frequently disputed on the floors of Con-

21.
gress by the party out of power.

And a

contemporaneous

exposi-

tion of the constitution practiced and acqutsced under for
such a length of time,fixes the constitution and the courts
refuse to

shake or control it.

(Swaurt v.Laird 1 Cranch 299;

Martins v.llunter's Lessee 1 Wheaton,304;Cohen v.Com.of Va.6
Wheaton 204;Prig v.Com.Pa.16 Peters,569;olcott v.Supervisors,
10 Wall.pp,690-91.)
Third,if the
ing thdn what

"general

welfare" clause had no wider mean-

is included in the subsequent powers at the

time our government was founded, it has come to include more
and the new meaning

may be read into it.

If this does not establish conclusively,it is certainly
sufficient to raise a doubt as to whether Congress is vested
with a greater power than that given by the sixteen subsequent
enumerations following the general clause. The benefit of
that doubt must be given to the legislature;as it is never to
be presumed that they overstep/ed their authority. Judge Cooley says:

"A doubt of the constitutional validity of a statute

is never sufficient to warrant its being set aside."

'-°

The extent to which the courts may go

in

declaring

the legislature

void

much difference

of opinion as to how far the

there are some
that

dicta in

the various

some

well

settled

passing upon the validity
Amon - these is

otent

considered.

There has boeen
courts should go;

cases that wouldi indicate

the courts are not generally agreed upon this

there are
in

7ill ne-:t be

an act of

point.

rules recognized oy all
of an legislative

that the national

But

our courts

enactment.

legislature

is

as omnip-

English Parliament,over subjects committed to

as the

its care;and while it confines

itself

within the

scope of its

power,none of its acts can be questioned on constitutional
grounds.

It

is

only .hen

Congress legislates

upon subjects

not within the sphere of its authority;or uses means to affect an end,when

such means are prohibited,that

declared unconstitutional

by the

courts.

an act may be
The mere fact that

a legislative act is unjust or oppressive;that it violates
rights and privileges of the citizen,is not sufficient to authorize a court to declare it voidunless it can be shown
that such injustice is prohibitedor such rights and privileges guarranteed by the constitution. Judge Cooley says:

"The

judiciary can only arrest the execution of a statute when it
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conflicts with the constitution. It cannot run a race of opinions upon points of rightreason,and
law makin

rower.

expediency with tho

The question of the validity

of a

statute

must always be one of legislative competency to enact it;not
one of policy,propriety or strict justice."
Chief Justice MJarshall

says:

ULet the ena be legitimate,

let it be within the scope of the constitution,and all
\vich are appropriate,vrhich

are plainly

adapted to

means

that end,

which are not prohibited,but consist with the letter and the
spirit of the constitution,are constitutional."
No rule of law is

better settled

than that laid

down

above by Marshall and Cooley. And it is settled wisely;for if
the courts were

at liberty

to determine the validity of legis-

lative

acts on grounds of natural justice,legislation could

not be

carried on without their assent.
A rule equally as well

can be no

settled,and about which the-e

question,is that Conrress can laY and collect taxes

for no other than a public purpose.
raising revenue;revenue
pose.

When it

is

prostituted

Taxation is

cannot be raisea
to objects

a mode of

for a private purin

no way connected

with the public interests or welfare,it ceases to be taxation
and becomes plunder.
iBut
it must be remembered that what is for the pLablic
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good,and whit a1e

public purposesare

islature

must decide upon its

which it

is

qu,.1stions which the lef-

own judgment,and in

respect

invested with large discretion which cannot

controlled b:

to

be

the courts,except,perhaps :,here its action is

clearly evasive,and whee under pretense of lawful

authority,

it

(Cooley's

has presumed to exercise one that is

unlawrul."

Const.Lim.p ,157).
Where the power that is exercised is legislative in its
character,the

courts can enforce only those limitation

the constitution

imposes;not

those implied restrictions

which
which

resting in theory only,the people have been sAtisfied to leave
to the judgment,patriotism,and

sense of justice

of their

rep-

resentatives. Where however,a tax is clearly laid for a private purpose; and this

can be seen at first

blush;the public

interests being in no way affected by it; such a tax is according to the weighIt of authority void,and

it

within the power

of the courts to so declare it.
To accurately define what

constitutes a public purpose

as distinguished from a private wouild be a difficult task.
There is but one
the popular will.

standard by which it can be decided which is
What wo-Uid be beneficial

clearly for the general
another.

good in

to the public and

one instance,might not

An interest that would be consiaered

strictly

in
pri-
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vate in one age might be looked upon as one in which the public was interested by a later generation. If a majority of the
people of the United States should become believers of the
Bellamy doctrine,then virtually

all interests whatsoever

wiould be public. At one time it was thought by nearly all peoplejto be for the general welfare of governments to have an
established religion;or one to which the state gave assistance.

This is so in many countries at the present time.
But the American people have decided that it is for the

general good of the nation to neither hamper or aid any particular creed.

The wisdom of this policy has been clearly

proven;and the indications are that at no far distant day all
peoples will adopt the same view.

It

may be asked what does

this prove? It proves that such questions must be decided by
the people and by no other power. This being so,if a majority
of the American people decide that developing the United
States into a sugar producing nation would promote the general welfare of the people,I know of no power that can restrict
a legislative enactment looking to such an endupon the ground
that it was a mistaken policy. All the court could say in
such a case would be, that the legislature,had passed an act
whichin the opinion of the judges was contrary to abstract
principles of right.
"Independently of express

constitutional restrictions,

'IJo

it

(legislature)

can make appropriations

of money whenever

rublic may require,or will be promoted oy itan

th2

it is the

judge of what is for the public good. "(Judge Denio 3 Kernanp,
145)
"The doctrine that there exists in the judiciary some
vagueloose and undefined power to annul a lawbecause in its
judgment it is contrary to nature,equity and justice,is in
conflict with the first principles of government,and can never
I think be maintained,"

(Judge Sheldon Id.,p,428).

Some other ground wiotud have
court

in

declaring it

ducers works

void.

an injustice,and

If

to be shown

paying

to justify

bounties to

such injustice

is

a

sugar pro-

prohibited,

it would be sufficient. If it violates some right,and such
right is guarranteedthe same would be true.
The only grounds upon which either of these objections
could be raised,is that the act contemplates using revenues
for a private purpose. This point was raised in Congress by
the opposition. It was argued that in lending government aid
to sugar producers,the whole people were being taxed to build
up a private industry.
A hypothetical case involving the validity of this
clause alone,vzas recently argued before the Moot
Cornell University School of Law.
this ground by the

supreme

Court of the

It was aeclared void on

court and on appeal

the decision
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was affirmed by the upper court. Chief Justice Hutchinsin a
very able orinion,after giving much study of what constitutes
a public as distinguished from a private interest,held that
the clause could not stand as it
private purpose.

He staid:

taxed the people for a purely

"A public purpose,as I understand

the term,is a purpose that has in
act is

view the general public. An

for the public benefit when its

immediate object is

the good of the people or members of the body

politic.

If

it

is primarily for the advantage of a private enterprise and
only indirectly beneficial to the publicit cannot in reason
or in

law be classed as legislation for the public good.......

...... It is apparent,I think,that the direct purpose of this
law is

private in

its

character. "

Looking at the immediate effect of the act,which is to
pay to private individuals money taken from the

hational

treasury;and making that the test of its public or private
characterthe conclusion reached by the court is both reas nable and sound. But it

is

by no means well settled that such

is the true test by which to be guided in such a case. It is

laid down in

numerous cases that it

is

the ultimate end or

object of appropriations that must be looked to in
the character of the use

for which the money is

deciding

expended.

Chief Justice Dickinson in 19 Wis. 689,says:

"It is not
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the individual payment that tests the public character of the
appropriation. Inividuals are always the
lic funds. We find it

recipients of pub-

paid by viay of bounty for the scalps of

panthers,wolves,foxes,crows,blackbirds,to

the poor,to the

education of the young,as rewards for the apprehension of
horse thieves~colleges,agricultural

societies,and to other

useful objects."
One of the ablest judges that ever adorned the supreme
bench of

Pennsylvania said:

any possible

"It

is

enough that we

can see

public interest in the act,or public benefit to

be derived from it. All beyond that is a question of expediency for the legislature,not of law,much less of constitutional

law to be determined by

the courts."

( 21 Pa.St.147).

Tumerous other cases of high atLthority might be
the

cited

to

same effect if

space would permit. Enough has been quoted
differ
howeverto show that the courtsAupon what is the proper test
in passing on this question. !]or is it surprisingsas it involves a question of policy;and judges being faliable,are as
liable to err

in their judgment upon sich matters as the

legislators.
The arguments for and against the expediency of this
I egislationforms no part of the subject of this paper. It is
sufficient to say that they existas was abundantly shown in
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the debates on the bill in Congress. Upon the subject party
lines were sharply drawn. If an injustice has been perpetrated
upon the people by the passage of this actit can be effectively remedied by the people as by a judicial decision. There
is much unjust legislation for which the only remedy is the
chastisement at the polls of our repi-esentatives,who have

betrayed the trust imposed in them.
That able and learned jurist,Judge Dillon,has said:
"Justice has her imperial seat in the bossom of every man-and
there,and not on specific constitutional provisions,must relief be had in many cases of indenfensible legislation-the
remedy being,to secure a repeal of the law and not its judicial annulment. "
It is further more true that those who are entrusted
with making our laws have a greater dread of being "scourged
into retirement by their indignant masters" than of a me-e
judicial decision or decree. The highest ambition of our public men is to please the people;not to offend them by proposing measures with which they have no sympathy. A thorough examination of the "popular pulse" generally precedes every s
step taken by our legislators both state and national. The
people are not only the source of all power;but are fast becoming the source from which our public men draw their convictions on the questions of the day.
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The validity

of giving government

aid for the purpose

of developing the United States into a sugar growing country,
is

soon to be pa.3sed upon,it

is

said,by the highest

judicial

tribunal in the land. The decision will be waited with much
interest,owing to the extensive discussion that has taken
Congress and by the press of the

place both in

countryv

"

4i

As to whether Congress has power to pass laws looking
to the general welfare of the country,under subdivision one
of section eightthere can be no doubt. It

is also well set-

tled,that the people through their representatives in Congress are the judges

of what

is for the public good and what

is not.
It would appear,according to one standard of deciding
what is a public and what a private interest that the means
adopted in this instance are illegal;by another standard it
safe to say

is

that they are not. The result is that a doubt id

raised so long as there is no recognized standard by which it
can be tested. The act,as has been shown before, is entitled
to the benefit

of the doubt. This being so, the validity of the

sugar bounty clause of the M!cKinley Tariff is established.

